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INTRODUCTION  
 
Ambulance services play an important role in the English National Health Service 
(NHS); however, they are under researched in management inquiry. A particular issue 
has arisen concerning the changing role of ambulance personnel and the extent to which 
organisational culture(s) promote or impede transformation (Wankhade and Mackway-
Jones 2015). The controversial nature of performance measures within the service is a 
significant feature in this.  
 
 
   The effectiveness of a wide variety of organisations has been linked to the culture of the 
organisation. There is some intuitive appeal in the proposition that organisational culture 
may be a relevant factor in healthcare performance, but the possible relationship between 
culture and performance is not conclusively established, since both ‘culture’ and 
‘performance’ as variables are conceptually and practically distinct (Kotter and Heskett 
2011). For instance, Scott et al. (2003) argued against simple assumptions, such as 'strong 
cultures lead to good performance'. Their study suggests a more contingent relationship, 
in that particular aspects of performance valued within different cultures may be 
enhanced within organisations that exhibit such cultural traits; but only those aspects.  
 
 
   Nevertheless, changing organisational culture is now a familiar prescription for health 
sector reform in the UK. The Francis Report (2013) and other recent reports (Care 
Quality Commission CQC 2015; Kirkup 2015) emphasise the need for organisations to 
create the right culture to deliver high-quality care. Konteh et al. (2010) identified an 
“increasing interest” in “managing organizational cultures as a lever for improving 
quality of care” (p.111). However, this assumes that the NHS and its constituent 
organisations possess a discernible culture with some bearing on performance and quality 
(Department of Health DH 2001; Mannion et al. 2005; Wankhede  2012). 
 
 
   This article explores whether and in what way organisational cultures and sub-cultures 
impede, rather than promote, organisational change (Harris and Ogbonna 1998; Morgan 
and Ogbonna 2008). This issue is approached first through a selected literature review on 
organisational culture, sub-cultures and in particular the concept of cultural perpetuation. 
Ogbonna and Harris (2014) argued that there had been limited research into the 
perpetuation of organisational cultural traits, especially in the context of managerial 
efforts to promote change. Their framework then informs our analysis of the management 
and perpetuation of organisational culture in one large NHS ambulance trust by providing 
key themes for the analysis of the empirical data derived from an ethnographic study. 
However, this article goes beyond Ogbonna and Harris by identifying additional themes 
on the nature of culture change and perpetuation, particularly the impact of performance 
measures, and how this affects the prospects for organisational change.  
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   In the next section, we review the literature on organisational cultures and sub-cultures 
and also introduce the role of performance measures in the culture of ambulance services. 
We then present our conceptual framework for analysis of cultural perpetuation. The 
following section describes the methodology used in the study before the empirical 
results are presented and analysed. Implications of the findings are discussed next 
followed by concluding remarks. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Organisational cultures and sub-cultures 
 
The concept of organisational culture has become more prominent in studies of 
organisational change recently, since structural changes have come to be seen as 
inadequate on their own as a means for reform (Jorritsma and Wilderom 2012; Konteh et 
al. 2010). However, this interest in organisational culture is problematic because there are 
varied perspectives on organisational cultures and how they impact on organisational 
behaviour (Hatch 1993; Smirchich 1983). The competing perspectives fall largely into 
two categories. Some writers see culture as a thing the organisation has, i.e. a critical 
variable that can be controlled like any other (Deal and Kennedy 1982; Peters and 
Waterman 1982). Others see culture as something the organization is, i.e. as a 'root 
metaphor' (Meek 1988; Morgan 1986; Smirchich 1983). 
 
   Meek (1988) notes that some theorists presume a tangible collective culture which can 
be created and manipulated to enhance social cohesion and integration, thus enhancing 
organisational effectiveness. She suggests that this blurs conflicts of individual or group 
interests and the ways in which power, authority and control are structured in 
organisations. Writers who see culture as 'owned by management' assume culture is 
homogenous, created at the highest level of organisations and dispersed top down as 
norms are internalised by organisational actors. However, most anthropologists see 
culture as arising from collective social interactions.  Meek holds that culture is the 
product of shared symbols and meanings emerging from such interactions and that the 
interpretation of organisational culture is “deeply embedded in the contextual richness of 
the total social life of the organizational members” (ibid, p. 463). She proposes that 
culture can only be described or interpreted and that agency is crucial; people produce, 
reproduce and transform culture. It is the task of the researcher to observe individual 
behaviour and make use of culture as a tool for interpreting that behaviour. Thus for 
Meek, culture may be seen interpretively as patterns of symbolic discourse or as myths, 
folklore, sagas and rituals, rather than as an object subject to management control. 
 
   For Knights and Wilmott (1987) such approaches disregard the political and material 
contexts. Much research fails to expose the relationships of power and domination 
underlying management practices and ignores the process by which culture is constructed 
and deconstructed. They argue that the functionalist and interpretive paradigms both 
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neglect the wider social context, ignoring, for example, class relationships. The wider 
context can support a ‘dialectic of control' where there is passive resistance to the real as 
opposed to apparent imposition of implied changes (e.g. a reluctance to actually 
implement new management techniques). Similarly, Willmott (1993) identifies the 
interest in 'corporate culture' in the 1980s, which he calls ‘corporate culturalism’, as a 
‘sinister’ attempt to gain greater commitment and flexibility from employees by 
managing not just what they do but also how they think and feel. However, he also argues 
that the alternative approach of regarding culture as a 'root metaphor', focussing on 
organisational symbolism and diverse cultural artefacts, may become an end in itself, 
rather than questioning the ultimate goals of corporations or championing the notion of 
consensus developed through open democratic debate.  
 
   Despite these disputes, most definitions recognise the socially constructed nature of a 
phenomenon that is expressed in terms of patterns of behaviour. Schein (1985) identifies 
a pluralistic dimension to culture, operating at three distinct levels. The first comprises 
‘artefacts’, including rewards, rituals and ceremonies. These are concerned with the 
observational patterns of behaviour (e.g. green uniform for ambulance crews).  At the 
next level are the espoused ‘beliefs and values’ which may be used to justify particular 
behavioural patterns (e.g. the valuing of speedy ambulance response). At the third level 
are the ‘assumptions’, which are the real and largely unconscious beliefs and expectations 
held and shared by individuals (e.g. uniformed emergency service versus emergency 
health service). Successfully changing cultures, therefore, requires that change impacts 
on all these levels, which may prove difficult. Hatch (2000) and Pettigrew (1990) 
highlight difficulties in studying culture at the deepest levels outlined by Schein, but 
others argue that culture can be uncovered at all levels (Kilmann et al. 1985; Christensen 
and Gordon 1999).  
 
Organisational Culture and Public Services 
 
There may be even greater issues around culture within the public sector because it 
centres on the delivery of professionally based services, notably in local government and 
health services.  Traditionally, there have been major and often dominant professions 
such as doctors, the police and social workers.  This has led, within the NHS in particular, 
to the development of new professional groups who have sought professional recognition 
to defend their roles within service areas dominated by more, well-established, groups. 
Consequently, the continuing expansion of new specialisms, seeking formal recognition 
of their professional status, has further increased the challenge presented by competing 
sub-cultures within the public sector as a whole.   
 
   The necessity of understanding the place of organisational sub-cultures in driving 
cultural change follows from this analysis. For instance, Williams van Rooij (2011) 
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concluded that successful innovation in higher education requires the consensus of two 
sub-cultures, namely technologist and the academic sub-cultures. Fitzgerald and Teal 
(2004) found that cultural differences between groups of doctors, nurses and others are 
not limited to being between the occupational groups but include differentiation within 
the medical profession, based upon specialization, generation, educational background, 
employment status and engagement with the organisation.  
 
   Similarly, the significance of sub-cultures in the Ambulance Service is highlighted by 
Wankhade (2012), who applied Schein's (1996) typography in an ethnographic study of 
an ambulance trust to identify three distinct occupational sub-cultures. 
 
1. The ‘Operator’ culture of the front-line crews (paramedics and technicians) who 
respond to all emergency 999 calls. 
2. The ‘Engineering’ culture of the Call takers and Call dispatchers who receive all 
999 calls and dispatch vehicles to an emergency; 
3. The ‘Executive’ culture of the Chief Executive and the senior executive team. 
 
   A variety of assumptions and values were found in the different occupational groups: 
there is no ‘single’ ambulance culture, but rather ‘multiple’ cultures. Respondents spoke 
as members of their occupational ‘tribes’, each with its own assumptions, values and 
beliefs, reinforced by their specific attitudes towards performance (Wankhade 2012). 
 
 
Performance Measures and Culture 
 
Heath and Radcliffe (2007) examined the performance measurement regime then applied 
to the English Ambulance Service. It concentrated on response times, which are clearly 
important. However, focussing solely on the time taken for vehicles to arrive at the scene 
of an incident disregards what happens there and so services were not being judged on 
the full package of care they provided. The regime fell into many of the pitfalls identified 
in the academic literature concerning the perverse incentives and unintended 
consequences often associated with performance measurement and reporting (Heath and 
Radcliffe 2010; Wankhade 2011). Indeed the service became notable as an example of 
how targets may promote 'gaming' (Heath et al. 2017; Heath and Wankhade 2014, Heath 
and Radcliffe 2010). 
 
 
   This was particularly significant because of the changing role of ambulance paramedics. 
Previously this was seen only as stabilising patients in extreme situations and transporting 
them rapidly to A&E units; but it has been evolving to use a greater range of skills in a 
wider variety of situations (Heath et al. 2017). Increasing levels of education and training 
are intended to provide better triage and treatment at the scene by emergency ambulance 
staff, although it seems the most qualified paramedics may not be always used to 
maximum advantage (National Audit Office NAO 2011). Indeed, McCann et al. (2013) 
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held that the professionalization strategy promoted at senior level had so far had limited 
traction due to power issues and other institutional priorities and pressures. They 
concluded that “institutional work in such a setting is necessarily less about trying to 
change organisations and institutions, and more about maintenance” (p.772). 
 
 
   Over time the performance measures became very controversial and the extant 
performance indicators seemed liable to inhibit the acceptance of the changing role 
(Radcliffe and Heath 2009; Wankhade and Brinkman 2011).  The challenge was to devise 
an approach which reflected the increasingly multi-faceted nature of ambulance work and 
countered gaming.  In December 2010, the Coalition government announced the launch 
of a set of clinical quality indicators for ambulance services (NHS Information Centre 
2013). As the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) stated, the use of “a suite of clinical 
quality indicators … will lead to a reduction in double responses being sent and give 
ambulance services more flexibility to find the most appropriate response for these calls, 
not the quickest one” (PAC 2011-12 para 12).  Timeliness was still seen as an important 
aspect of performance, but indicators of outcome or processes relevant to outcome were 
also included in the 'dashboard'. The approach responded to the debates concerning the 
previous regime but, whilst generally welcome, there were concerns that some indicators, 
most notably response times, would be stressed at the expense of others (Heath and 
Wankhade, 2014; McCann et al. 2013). A recent report by the NAO (2017) suggests that 
may indeed have been the case.   
 
  
   The report identifies three key findings that support the central theme of the present 
paper. These are: 
 
 “10 Ambulance trusts have made progress in delivering new models of  
 care but barriers are hindering wider adoption. 
 11 Ambulance trusts are struggling to meet response time targets  
 although clinical outcomes for some patients are improving. 
 12 Important aspects other than response times require attention when 
managing ambulance service performance.” (NAO 2017 p. 8) 
 
 
  Thus the variety of cultures that exist within the ambulance service (Wankhade 2012) 
present a challenge to those attempting to reform the service, as indeed do the potentially 
conflicting demands placed on the service by modified performance measures and a 
challenging environment.  
 
  
  The NAO report also found that, even though the new performance measures have been 
introduced, “commissioners, regulators and providers still place too much focus on 
meeting response times” (p. 8). This has led to perverse outcomes where resources are 
dispatched before assessment takes place to clarify whether a fully equipped ambulance 
is needed. It is important, therefore, to explore how dominant cultures at various levels 
 6 
within the service may act against the effective introduction of new modes of working 
and how response times still dominate the thinking of ambulance service personnel. 
 
 
Cultural Change and Perpetuation  
 
There are different perspectives on cultural change, including Martin's (1985) view of 
'cultural purists' and 'cultural pragmatists'. Similarly, Ogbonna and Harris (2002) identify 
'optimists', 'pessimists' and 'realists'; as (i) those who believe culture is significantly 
susceptible to conscious management action; (ii) those who reject that view completely; 
and (iii) those who argue that only some aspects of culture may be changed and only 
under certain organisational conditions.   
 
 
   Ogbonna and Harris (2014) call for an understanding of the dynamics of organisational 
culture that encompasses the idea of cultural perpetuation. Perpetuation is defined by 
them as the “continuation of core cultural values, beliefs, and assumptions such that they 
become enduring in such a way that new generation of organisational members are 
conditioned to adopt them in responding to various organisational contingencies” (ibid, p. 
668). In their study of an English Premier League Football club, they found evidence of 
five intra-organisational and extra-organisational factors that have implications for both 
culture management and cultural perpetuation. These are: 
 
1. Historical Legacy: which includes tales of founding fathers, great victories, etc. 
(in this case, the history of paramedics as uniformed emergency service 
employees rather than as health care practitioners); 
 
2. Organisational Symbolism: the role of myths, heroes and associated artefacts 
(e.g. uniforms and response time targets); 
 
3. Subcultural Dynamics: the existence and interaction of sub-cultures (e.g. those 
of different ambulance service 'tribes' such as executives, middle managers, 
paramedics and control room staff); 
 
4. Employment Practices: HRM interventions that can contribute to cultural 
change or perpetuation (such as education and training initiatives in the 
ambulance service); and 
 
5. Extra-organisational Influences: the effects of constituent parts of 
organisational contexts on culture management, change and perpetuation in 
organisations (for example, of central government on ambulance services). 
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   Ogbonna and Harris also emphasise the role of internal actors, not as passive recipients 
of institutional pressures, but as active participants whose interactions with their 
immediate environments contribute to the creation and preservation of values.  
 
   Earlier authors recognised these issues and this influenced the original research.  The 
capacity of culture to be self-perpetuating was proposed by Sathe (1983, 1985). Historical 
legacy is commonly discussed in the literature. Stories and artefacts associated with 
founders are transformed into strong symbols (Hatch 1993) and could result in strategic 
'heritance' or 'hangover' for subsequent generations (Ogbonna and Harris 2001). Similarly, 
symbols have been seen as central to understanding culture (Hatch 2000; Schein 1985). 
The literature also explores organisational sub-cultures (Martin and Siehl 1983; Morgan 
and Ogbonna 2008; van Maanen and Barley 1985), and the role of HRM interventions, 
such as selective recruitment or internal promotions, that can contribute to cultural 
change or perpetuation (Ogbonna and Harris 2014; Ogbonna and Whipp 1999). 
 
   Previous studies of unsuccessful attempts at cultural change in the ambulance services 
concentrate on employee resistance and/or managerial ineffectiveness and design 
deficiencies (Wankhade 2012; Wankhade and Brinkman 2014). The framework provided 
by Ogbonna and Harris (2014) suggests that failure to change culture may result from 
peculiarities in the culture itself as well as in the way the change programme was 
implemented. In particular, organisations (such as ambulance services) with a strong 
history of previous success and a contingent combination of internal and external factors 
that promote and perpetuate existing values seem likely to develop cultures which are 
less susceptible to management control. Similarly, Anand et al. (2005) argue that 
socialisation processes influence individuals into accepting on-going practices within the 
organisation and their rationalisations. In so far as this is true, elements of the culture 
may well impede Government policy initiatives; such as promoting a wider role for 
paramedics, integrating ambulance services into the wider NHS and enhancing clinical 
and leadership practices. 
 
   Our approach is to understand the values and assumptions of the social actors although 
some part of our evidence is derived from the symbolic expressions, employment 
practices and their attitudes towards organisational performance. By focussing on the 
ambulance services we echo the argument initially proposed by Gordon (1991) that 
organisational or corporate culture gets strongly influenced by the characteristics of the 
industry in which the company operates.     
 
 
METHODS  
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Data was collected by the first author during 2007-09 as part of a larger study at a trust, 
which we call ‘Delta’ to ensure confidentiality. Factors perpetuating existing cultural 
values and preventing cultural change are analysed in the research. Due to the exploratory 
nature of the study, the primary aim was to access the different experiences of a range of 
staff within the organisation in understanding their social settings (Tangherlini 2000; Van 
Maanen 2011; Watson 2011). Rich case studies have a considerable potential to play a 
mainstream role in organisation and management studies (Yin 2009). 
 
 
   More than seventy qualitative, semi-structured interviews were conducted in two 
phases. Interviews lasted between 30 to 90 minutes and were digitally recorded to be 
transcribed later. In order to understand the social processes, the main inclusion criteria 
of the selected sample were their professional roles and suitability to the aims of this 
study. A ‘purposive’ sampling strategy (Denzin and Lincoln 2011; Miles and Huberman 
1994) was considered to be the most effective method to recruit the participants in this 
study, to facilitate understanding of the social dynamics of a range of actors within Delta 
trust and to explore their perceptions and understanding of performance management in 
re-enforcing culture perpetuation in the context of organisational change underlying the 
case. The key actors identified included senior board executives, managers, and frontline 
staff- paramedics, the 999 call handlers and the dispatchers working in the control room 
(table 1). This helped to identify and analyse the interdependence between different 
occupational groupings (Wankhade 2012) allowing a better understanding of the 
dynamics of the culture in the organisation. To further improve the validity of the 
findings, ambulance policy experts working outside the Delta trust were also interviewed.  
 
Table 1: Semi-structured interviews   
 
Senior board executives (including non-
executives) 
x 23 
Managers (including corporate & 
operational)  
x 32 
Paramedics  x 3 
Control room staff  x 10 
Ambulance policy experts  x 3 
 
   
  There were relatively few interviews with paramedics due to frequent cancellations 
owing to their busy work patterns and were conducted with those who were available and 
willing to participate in the study. This was compensated for by the time spent on non-
participant observation of paramedics on the road and at the ambulance stations. An 
informed consent was taken from the personnel observed and the study aims and purpose 
of data collection were made clear. The focus of the observation was to watch the 
participants in their social settings to understand and appreciate their viewpoint while 
gaining insights about the organisation. Indeed, about 100 hours of non-participant 
observation informed this study (table 2). Use of observation as an integral part of 
ethnographic fieldwork is supported in the literature (Adler and Adler 1994; Angrosino 
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and Rosenberg 2013; Gold 1997). The observation was carried out at the corporate level, 
with middle managers and frontline staff; allowing an analysis of the interdependence 
between these various organisational dimensions. The first author attended open trust 
board meetings, internal executive meetings and middle management team meetings. 
Operations in the control rooms were observed and time was also spent in the ambulance 
stations, travelling with ambulance crews and in the canteen where managers, junior 
executives, and frontline staff took breaks. Observation was complemented by informal 
conversations in the ‘corridors’ with staff. Empirical data discussed in the paper uses 
quotes from the analysis of the interviews. Observation data is appropriately signposted.  
 
Table 2: Details of observation and time spent 
 
Executive and trust board meetings x 10 (40 hrs) 
Managerial meetings  x 4 (11hrs) 
Control room visits  x 8 (18 hrs) 
Ambulance ride-ons & station visits x 6 (19 hrs) 
Canteen & small talk (15 hrs) 
 
 
 
   Such an approach is in conformity with the use of multiple data collection strategies to 
build the in-depth case and improve the quality of the case study research (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner 2007). The observation data were recorded manually in books by writing down 
within 2-3 days of the observation. Subsequently they were typed as full notes and this 
textual data was interpreted using an informal coding framework to reflect passages that 
clearly explained the core research themes to add our interpretations to the phenomena 
observed. The process included familiarisation with the interview transcripts and 
developing coding labels which enabled themes to be developed from the interview 
accounts and experiences of the research participants and also from existing literature to 
address the main research question. Discussion between the authors facilitated critical 
exploration of responses, discussion of deviant cases and agreement on recurring themes 
within the data (Gale et al. 2013). This is supported by Lawrence et al. (2011) who argue 
for a closer relationship between the institutions and social actors who populate them. 
Observational data was used successfully in another recent study on ambulance 
professionalization (McCann et al. 2013).  
 
 
   Interview data were transcribed manually and following the approach of Strauss and 
Corbin (1998), an open coding approach was used to group initial identification of 
themes into categories. The interview data was further cross-checked with field notes to 
derive a greater understanding of the issues. Axial coding technique was followed by 
further scrutiny and merger/reduction into fewer categories by identifying relationships 
among the open codes. Responses to the key themes were analysed repeatedly and 
through content analysis until theoretical saturation was reached (Charmaz 2003; Glazer 
and Strauss 1967; Lincoln and Guba 1985). The Appendix summarises additional 
evidence on the key themes and relative strength of evidence. Through this method, the 
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process of culture change was explored and factors responsible for perpetuating cultural 
values and beliefs identified. Ethical approval for the larger study was obtained from the 
local NHS research ethics committee.  
 
 
   There are some limitations to the study. The evidence comes from a single NHS 
ambulance trust. Inevitably, a relatively small number of paramedics could participate. 
Data was collected during 2007-2009 and further empirical research would be valuable to 
test the continuing relevance of the findings. However, the evidence gathered in the study 
corresponds to the issues raised in recent studies examining cultural characteristics and 
implications for ambulance services (Fisher et al. 2015; NAO 2017; Wankhade et al. 
2015).  
 
 
RESULTS  
 
Historical Legacy 
 
When the Health Service was created in 1948, the Ambulance Service became part of 
local government not the NHS. It followed the established emergency services in 
adopting artefacts like uniforms and rank structures (Pollock 2013). Since becoming part 
of the wider NHS in 1974, the Ambulance Service has been evolving from a simple 
transport service into a pre-hospital health care service and is the first point of access for 
a wide variety of health problems (NAO 2010). However: 
 
The ambulance service is perceived as the transport arm of the NHS, simply 
there to get patients from their homes or the scene of an accident to the 
nearest accident and emergency department. (Senior board executive I) 
 
 
   It is estimated however that less than ten per cent of emergency 999 callers have a life 
threatening condition (Evans et al. 2014) and alternate care options are provided to most 
ambulance service users (Radcliffe and Heath 2009; Wankhade 2011). This has given 
rise to calls for organisational change, particularly in the role, education and training of 
paramedics so that they may carry out a wider range of activities, such as referrals, giving 
advice and treatment at the scene. Calls for professionalization of the work force (First et 
al. 2012) have resulted in paramedic training moving into the universities with a range of 
advanced specialist paramedic roles being developed. Staff with specialist roles (such as 
critical care paramedics or emergency care practitioners) are now equipped with 
enhanced knowledge and skills needed to make complex decisions about patient care. 
However, tension seems to have arisen around these developments.  For example: 
 
Currently we still have a large number of staff who are highly competent in 
psycho motor skills that they’ve been taught…I need to change it into a 
culture where they can think, where they can assess, where they can decide 
not just against algorithms but actually against the scope of practice and so 
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that’s a significant migration in individuals and in systems. (Senior clinician 
I) 
 
I think that there's a need to change the nature of the workforce...we need to 
take a non-professional blue-collar workforce and migrate it into being a 
professional workforce. (Clinician II) 
 
  
  These quotations suggest there are some continuing challenges around reluctance to 
accept the changing role of ambulance staff wholeheartedly. 
 
 
   Thus historical factors help promote the perpetuation of cultural beliefs and preferences 
as highlighted by Ogbonna and Harris (2014). During informal conversations with staff, 
the dilemma of progressing from a historical trauma-based organisation to a modern 
clinically trained pre-hospital mobile healthcare service was often mentioned as a factor 
which thwarted modernisation efforts. Vestiges of the old command and control culture, 
accompanied by a blame culture, hierarchical and top-down management styles, 
resistance to change and risk-averse behaviour are some of the historical factors reported 
by Wankhade and Brinkman (2014). Indeed risk aversion is such that conveyance of 
patients to emergency departments may be still the “default safety net” because “you 
don’t lose your job from taking a patient to hospital” (O’Hara et al. 2015 p. 49).  
 
 
 
Organisational Symbolism 
 
 
While senior executives extolled the virtues of developing new values and beliefs around 
professionalization of the service, symbolic expressions, which still supported the 
existing culture, were also expressed: 
 
A lot of our staff don’t think going to patients with minor things and leaving 
them at home is a worthwhile thing to have done. What our staff, in the way 
that they were recruited, if you like, the adrenalin junkies, they get there, they 
save someone's life, they drive somewhere else, deliver the patient to a team 
that's all… it’s like the telly isn’t it?.. They didn’t join up, as they will tell you, 
to be district nurses. (Senior board executive II) 
 
You know there is an obsession with the 8 minutes and a realisation – if you 
took it away I guess many things, in some areas, could get worse. 
(Ambulance policy expert I)   
 
 
   Senior executives sought the development of a 'new culture' focussing on 
recommendations set out by national ambulance policy review, Taking Healthcare to the 
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Patient (DH 2005). The review required a quantum culture shift for the ambulance 
service from a heroic but straightforward transport organisation to a clinically driven 
emergency service. This involved new management structures, treating a greater number 
of patients in the community and performing an enhanced clinical role. 
 
 
   The review built upon the previous efforts to modernise and professionalise ambulance 
service education (through paramedic degrees) and regulation (Health Professional 
Council); thus presenting a 'pivotal moment' to the ambulance trusts in becoming a 
clinically professional service within the NHS.  However, cultural artefacts, such as blue 
flashing lights and response targets, persist as organisational symbols, reflecting the 
historical legacy, and non-achievement of targets is still considered taboo by senior 
executives (McCann et al. 2015; NHS Confederation 2014): 
 
I think over the years it does seem to be very target driven and it doesn’t 
matter you know what the treatment’s like as long as you get there in time 
and I think that is the culture that a lot of people expect to feel. That’s what 
most people believe even though they don’t agree with it. (Senior manager I) 
 
You get fed up in chasing figures, numbers…There is no consideration of 
individuals. You then become creative in interpreting and massaging targets 
and figures. (Senior board executive III)  
 
    
The symbolic dimensions of these sub-cultures may also have played a part in the mutual 
mistrust identified at Delta: 
 
If I go and see a manager and communicate my indifference or otherwise 
then I can see one but I just don’t want to because I know it won’t make any 
difference and that’s what the staff I think are reflecting on. (Paramedic I)    
 
Actually there's a culture in certain parts of the organisation and probably 
this part, in the middle management, where managers believe that they know 
all the answers …they’ll have to have the last say in everything. (Senior 
board executive IV) 
 
As the above quotation suggests, at times this was linked explicitly to another important 
issue, that of sub-cultural dynamics. 
 
 
Sub-cultural Dynamics 
 
 
The importance of subcultural dynamics in cultural perpetuation is linked to subcultural 
centrality and subcultural domination. Wankhade (2012) documented the relative 
influence of three main sub-groups (executives, paramedics and control room staff). Each 
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of these groups was found to have distinct assumptions and beliefs about organisational 
performance and different attitudes towards cultural change. Here evidence is presented 
especially around the aspect of ‘relationships’ between different staff groups. For 
example, sub-cultural dynamics were seen to impede the full adoption of changing role of 
the paramedic  
 
The biggest problem that’s facing us is actually the fundamental culture that 
underpins everything in the organisation at both manager and staff level 
which is one of the blue collars to professionalism. A lot of the staff on the 
road, their thinking processes are still very much blue collar trade orientated 
in the sense that I turn up to work, I do my job and I go home and there’s no 
reflective practice. (Senior board executive V)  
 
The danger is frontline staff are still in the traditional adversarial role and 
we need to move the organisation forward… So there’s a lot of work to be 
done. (Senior Sector Manager II)  
 
 
   In addition, sub-cultures had an impact on inter-personal relationships and, therefore, 
behaviour. 
 
We have oodles of other challenges and cultures around the way people act 
with each other and that’s irrespective of sex and colour and all the rest of it.  
That’s just simply how people talk to each other at the moment is a real issue. 
(Paramedic II)  
 
 
 The rivalry and competition between the different sub cultural groups identified in our 
study is revealing and is helpful in identifying and understanding the nature and role of 
sub cultural groups in uniformed emergency response services.  
 
 
  These points are reinforced by Vignette 1 based on meetings observed by the first author. 
 
 
Vignette 1: Observation of meetings  
 
The trust executive meetings take place weekly on a Monday morning, at the trust 
headquarters buildings in elegant suite rooms. The walls are tastefully painted with 
prints, paintings and curtains and the floor has a fine carpet. The rooms are big with 
high ceilings, well furnished and decorated artfully. Delta is an amalgamation of four 
erstwhile ambulance trusts within the same region. The reorganised structure 
contains three administrative regions, each of which has separate meetings with their 
own management teams, usually every fortnight on different days of the week. The 
researcher attended four such meetings. All three meetings in Area I took place in 
the area director's office. The contrast with the executive meeting room could not be 
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more telling. The room had a desk for the occupant and a big table in front so it 
could double as a meeting room. The walls were decorated plainly and the floor 
similarly had a simple carpet. The meeting in Area II was shifted at the last minute 
to the trust headquarter building, but in a very small and cramped room with 
insufficient chairs and space. Significantly, one senior area manager commented on 
the “opulence” of the building compared to the poor state of their own facilities On 
occasions the conversation drifts to social matters and holiday plans are discussed. 
The atmosphere is relaxed with a distinctive local flavour and often jokes are made 
at the expense of senior executives. (Field notes, first author)  
 
 
 
Employment Practices 
 
 
Some aspects of employment practices appeared significant in promoting cultural 
endurance and undermining cultural change efforts. We have already referred to the 
somewhat contested change in the roles of paramedics and control room staff: 
 
I think the underpinning thing for me… is actually delivering the new 
agendas around education.  If I think that a competent clinician is my short-
term aim in order to deliver high quality care, I need a significant investment, 
both in future clinicians and present clinicians to take them and their 
competencies to where they need to be. (Clinician II) 
 
 
   Additionally, the insular internal recruitment process and the limited role of Delta's 
managers in operational and strategic aspects stood out. Several factors appear to have 
contributed to this. Traditionally, most senior personnel joined the service as front-line 
paramedics and worked their way through to managerial/executive positions. Many 
managers stated that it was not uncommon to find that senior executives (including chief 
executives) on the Trust boards had come from the ‘ranks’: 
 
Traditionally ambulance services had promoted and recruited from within 
their own ranks and that this was a typical uniform service approach in 
which if one worked for it long enough, one would get promoted because it’s 
his/her turn. This has resulted in a lack of ownership, understanding and 
accountability at all levels in the organisation and where the senior executive 
team were viewed as ‘Generals’ and lots of time is spent in looking ‘upwards’ 
for directions. (Station Manager I) 
 
 
   Furthermore, the eight-minute response time target is too short to allow any managerial 
intervention in ‘real time’ and, therefore, influence resides with the control room staff. 
Real time performance data is available to executives and managers but the allocation of 
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resources is a preserve of the control room staff. This allows little scope for managers to 
deal with performance issues as they arise. 
 
 
   Lack of opportunities for training and clinical education, often side-lined due to 
operational exigencies, was another issue highlighted by some of the managers during the 
interviews as affecting both themselves and the staff: 
 
I'm not sure you can change the nature of the workforce by giving them 5 
days a year to train. (Clinician III) 
 
 
   This has a significant bearing on executive efforts to bring cultural change. The 
management focus on performance targets further affected the personal development of 
this group. One senior executive expressed his ‘frustration’ about the lack of managerial 
skills in communicating the message” to the front-line staff. Some middle managers, on 
the other hand, complained about a ‘lack of genuineness’ on the part of senior 
management in involving them in actual decision-making processes and developing 
organisational strategies.  
 
 
   Operational managers were isolated from front-line staff due to shift patterns and from 
each other due to the distances involved, which resulted in their engagement in the 
organisation being limited to an implementation role. (This is a general issue in 
organisations: see Currie and Procter 2005). Thus they seemed to have limited influence 
on either the contents of the strategy or the operational activities supposed to deliver it. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, these middle managers could seem 'reluctant managers' (Scase 
and Goffee 1989). However, there were positive developments witnessed at Delta. For 
example, the development of the managerial strategic function was recognised by senior 
management and training programmes were enhanced. 
 
 
Extra-organisational Dimension  
 
 
Ogbonna and Harris (2014) demonstrate the importance of an extra-organisational 
dimension in understanding cultural perpetuation by particularly highlighting the role of 
football fans in their study. In our study, we saw the influence of other NHS 
organisations and the central government having a significant effect: 
 
Managers are under more pressure and I think managers do have a 
perceived tension. They understand what it is that’s happening in the clinical 
domain and have great tension within themselves about saying you should 
not do this, you should do this in order to deliver targets versus you should 
do this, you shouldn’t do this for individual patients. (Clinical governance 
manager I)  
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We are an organisation which is under political control whatever people say 
and the bottom line is that unless we deliver our headline targets we will be 
deemed to be a failed organisation and however much we squeal that we are 
doing it for the patients we will be removed. (Clinician II)  
 
  However, and significantly, the interviews suggested that other stakeholders, such as 
service users and other emergency services (police and fire), were regarded as having less 
influence on the organisational culture. This can be related to the expanding, but still 
limited, role and influence of the ambulance services within the wider NHS:  
 
Ten years ago we were very much part of the emergency services. Over the 
last 10 years we have become more and more meshed into the NHS way of 
working and we are in kind of no man’s land at the moment because the 
emergency services (fire and police) no longer see us as a full partner with 
them. (Senior board executive VI)    
 
 
   During the non-participant observations and ambulance ride-ons, this aspect was 
amplified. Discussions in the canteen pointed out the dilemma of being perceived as an 
emergency service akin to police and fire (wearing uniforms and attending emergencies) 
as against the expectation of been seen as an emergency pre-hospital care provider within 
the NHS family. Central government is clearly a significant external influence on 
ambulance services. However, frustration was expressed at Delta concerning the many 
and sometimes contradictory Government initiatives: 
 
Because they are all complete opposite in terms of incentives and the 
direction of travel that you would take to achieve any one of those… 
Sometimes you can sit back and you end up laughing because otherwise you 
would just cry. (Senior board executive I) 
 
The facts are not joined up. Because if you think about it and think about well 
hang on, well how does Payment by Results, Foundation Trusts, Practise-
Based Commissioning, Taking Health Care to the Patient – how does that all 
actually tie in. (Senior board executive III)  
 
 
   Considerable pressure from successive governments to promote the wider role of the 
ambulance professional, however, has inevitably had some effect in addressing the 
countervailing factors identified above (Radcliffe and Heath 2009). Furthermore, there 
are increasing numbers of instances suggesting that senior managers from other NHS 
services are coming into the organisation and likewise there is a growing movement of 
paramedics and nurses moving into different sectors of the NHS. Increasingly, medical 
personnel are being employed by individual ambulance trusts including as medical 
director. But some reservations remain. For example: 
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I have a horrible feeling that ...in 5 or 10 years’ time they (the ambulance 
trust) will be carrying on doing more of the same... I'm not confident that I 
could say in 10 years' time we will have a fantastic ambulance service that's 
really adding value to the patient. (Ambulance policy expert II) 
 
 
Other Factors Affecting Cultural Perpetuation at Delta 
 
 
The framework of Ogbonna and Harris proved valuable for revisiting the data, as we 
hope we have demonstrated. However, certain aspects pertaining to cultural perpetuation 
at Delta did not fit into the framework so smoothly. Two factors stood out. First, resource 
limitations seemed to inhibit both organisational and cultural change. 
 
Lots of things have changed. It has certainly got busier. Definitely you can 
say that. (Senior paramedic II) 
  
One major challenge in the work is getting through 12 hours with the same 
level of concentration, delivery of aptitude and energy for that amount of time. 
(Senior paramedic III) 
 
   This was amplified by the introduction of 'Call to Connect' which standardised and 
tightened the way the response time is now defined; i.e. the clock now starts at the 
moment the 999 call 'hit the switch board'  (Wankhade 2011): 
 
Call to connect is going to place huge pressures within ambulance services to 
get to places quicker...It is going to take up all the money, an estimated £21m 
in our service, when that £21m could be invested in education at the start of 
bringing healthcare to the patients. (Senior board executive II) 
 
 
  The second factor which stood out in the fieldwork was the primacy of the eight minute 
response time target. There was a general appreciation of the limitations of the target. 
 
The paradox of what good performance would mean is that (if) we get a 
vehicle quickly to an incident... from the perspectives of the organisation, it 
means performance standards are met... What we actually deliver from that 
point onwards is important in terms of patient care, appropriate intervention 
and investigation. It would then give a perfect picture of the two, namely the 
speed of response and quality of delivery (but) we only measure the speed 
and I think it is totally inappropriate. (Senior Paramedic III, emphasis 
added) 
 
It's a measure, but it's not necessarily always the best measure. You don't 
hear many ambulance staff saying I've done well because I got to that job in 
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6 minutes, you never hear that. But you often hear ambulance staff saying I 
did a good job then because the patient lived. (Area/Corporate Manager II) 
 
 
   This was heightened by a sense that many 'red' (priority) calls did not merit that status, 
a tendency believed to be increased by 'Call to Connect' which left control room staff 
with less opportunity to investigate the real nature of the call. Many respondents talked 
about their frustration in rushing to such jobs, which then turned out to be less serious 
incidents: 
 
You need to be sure that the eight minute calls are actually the red calls. 
They often turn out not to be and you feel awful and fearful that something 
could have happened to you or to a member of the public on the roads. 
(Observation data) 
 
 
  This is supported by the following vignette based on an observation by the first author. 
 
Vignette 2: Paramedic Observation  
 
After a busy shift, we return to the ambulance station. We saw a range of cases dealt by 
the crews. Routine transfer- an elderly patient is shifted from the care home to the 
hospital ward for investigation. We also rushed to an urgent 999 call which is about a 
stroke case which needed hospitalization. After completing the shift, we have a quick 
‘brew’ at the station and discuss whether crews feel the ‘adrenaline rush’ in driving fast 
with lights/sirens. The EMT tells me that many paramedics do not drive faster or slower 
based on the type of calls. For them an emergency is an emergency whether it is a red 
amber or green or with blue lights. One paramedic argues that he would not like to put 
himself at risk since in lots of jobs driving fast does not really make a difference. (Field 
notes, first author)  
 
 
   However, differences in attitudes towards the targets emerged in the research. 
Paramedics tended to be straightforwardly sceptical: 
 
My colleagues don't view performance because one of the major features in 
the ambulance service is one job at a time...No they don't really give a 
monkeys and do you know why they don't? It's because the minute they come 
here for a 12-hour shift... It's job after job after job. (Paramedic II) 
 
 
It's now very difficult when you are talking to staff about performance   
improvement, that they just see it as a code for hitting the target as opposed 
to genuinely trying to make change improvements for the patients themselves. 
(Senior board executive VII) 
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   Managers were more pragmatic in their views: 
 
(The) eight minute target is like, you know, the driver, for everything and you 
keep tweaking this and tweaking that to hit that target, hit that target...all you 
are concentrating on is getting that because you know that as a Trust if you 
don't hit that 75, everybody starts kicking you. (Senior board executive IX) 
 
I think that what we have with the response time target is an attempt to 
consider...the most critical factors within a single performance indicator.... to 
achieve a good response time what it requires for the organisation is to be 
reasonably healthy in most of the key areas. (Senior Area Executive I)  
 
  
 Nevertheless, there was recognition of potentially damaging effects on their work force: 
 
I don't necessarily believe that the national targets are necessarily the most 
accurate or realistic targets and... Therefore, I think there is an issue of 
morale...if your performance targets are too high and unrealistic, 
then ...people get very demoralised. (Senior manager III) 
 
   
 The varied comments above reflect the differing attitudes of different sub-cultural groups 
at Delta. They provide some evidence supporting the view that the performance regime 
had an inhibiting effect on attempts to transform the ambulance service culturally from 
being a uniformed service focussed on response times and stabilisation to a more 
professionalised one.  
 
 
DISCUSSION  
 
 
In our literature survey, we identified three main perspectives on organisational culture.  
Some see culture as akin to a tangible object, which is easily managed, and others see it 
as an intangible factor which can only be interpreted through symbols, myths, etc. The 
third group embrace the critique of the “corporate culturalists” made by the 
“organisational symbolists”, but then criticise the second group for concentrating too 
much on symbolism at the expense of power relationships within the organisation and 
extra-organisational factors. 
 
 
   Our results support the view that organisational culture is not easy to manipulate, 
manage or change, and that symbols, artefacts and sagas, etc., were significant at Delta. 
At the same time the complex dynamics of power were notable, with both paramedics 
and control room staff having significant autonomy and sub-cultures supporting cultural 
perpetuation, thereby obstructing (to some extent) government policy on the changing 
role of the ambulance professional. The ambiguous class position of paramedics, being 
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“blue-collar” and “professional” (McCann et al. 2013), seems relevant here, as it provides 
a ‘dialectic of control', in Knights and Wilmott’s terms. The literature about culture and 
professionalism in the public services (including ‘new professions’) also resonates.  
 
 
  Thus, the study provides support for the concept of ambulance tribes (Wankhade 2012), 
including that of another significant tribe: middle managers. A revealing finding is that 
middle managers were often unable or declined to take up more strategic roles. There 
were several occasions when managers were drafted into operational duties due to high 
numbers of emergency calls, some of which can be attributed to the lack of clinical 
development within the service. Indeed, managers’ adopting a ‘hands-on’ role when 
needed is part of the historical legacy of the Ambulance service, reinforcing the shared 
symbols and values of the workforce and their managers (see Meek 1988 above).   
 
 
   However, on the issue of cultural change, senior executives expected managers to 
imbibe and adopt an ambitious role transformation to become more strategic; but middle 
managers were subjected to unclear expectations, becoming caught between traditional 
and newer roles. Indeed, their response sometimes seemed typical of change blocking 
behaviour. ‘Socialisation’ emerged as an important facet regarding any transition towards 
a more strategic role (Currie and Procter 2005). Most of the managers were not 
newcomers but were being asked to adjust to a new role within a more professional 
service, for which their previous experience and socialisation had not prepared them. 
Their response was often to orient themselves to the traditional role into which they were 
socialised. Managers experienced a role transition along with the associated problems of 
role ambiguity and role conflicts.  
 
 
   Therefore, we contend that the ambulance service, with its historical legacy and 
combination of intra- and extra-organisational factors that perpetuate existing values, has 
developed enduring cultures that are resistant to executive control, supporting the work of 
Ogbonna and Harris (2014).  The prevalence of the factors identified by them suggests 
that changing organisational cultures in such settings is harder than policy documents 
imply or managers would wish. The point made by Anand et al. (2005) about the strength 
of socialization also seems to be supported. However, in Ogbonna and Harris' case, the 
five factors they identified uniformly support cultural perpetuation, whereas in our study 
two factors, employment practices and extra-organisational influences, seem more 
ambiguous in that education and training can support change and government policy 
definitely does.  
 
 
   Moreover, the earlier performance measures reinforced the cultural norms around 
response times and emphasised the rapid transportation of patients (Wankhade et al. 
2015). The recognition of the need to change these measures and a questioning of the role 
of targets within the health service suggests that government is increasingly aware of 
these issues. Thus the changes to the performance measurement regime seem supportive 
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of the broader paramedic role (Heath and Wankhade 2014), although simply expanding 
the performance measures is unlikely to be enough on its own. The practice of 
performance measurement might continue to exhibit dysfunctional effects (see NAO 
2017; Wankhade 2011) in which we see a range of behaviours, including management’s 
‘obsession’ with targets, ‘confusion’ as to their role as a proxy of organisational 
performance, a ‘fear of failure’ by the senior executives in not meeting targets, plus 
‘hostility’ and ‘resistance’ to targets resulting in staff de-motivation. In particular, there is 
the issue of whether the wider range of indicators in the dashboard has countered the 
previous tendency to game-playing, as it seems easier to game against a single indicator. 
Alternatively, the continuing pre-dominance of response times in practice may be 
sustaining opportunistic behaviour. This is a matter which requires further, up to date 
research.  
 
 
   Reference was made earlier to cultural ‘purists’ and cultural ‘pragmatists’ and to 
‘optimists’, ‘pessimists’ and ‘realists’. Our findings suggest that the paramedics fell into 
the category of the cultural ‘purists’ and ‘pessimists’ with a strong notion of their legacy 
and sub-cultural identity, their less than positive attitudes to cultural change and their 
frustration about lack of resource and ever-increasing performance demands. The 
managers came across as cultural ‘pragmatists’ and ‘realists’. They were very hands on, 
doing what they were told to do, but at times willing to be more strategic despite a lack of 
management training and education and to embark on the new direction of travel. The 
senior executives and experts overwhelmingly came across as ‘optimists’ and 
‘pragmatists’, guiding the cultural change process from the top, very mindful of their 
historical legacy and the role of ambulance services within the wider NHS, but also of 
meeting performance targets. However, the balance of the evidence presented here seems 
to favour the position of the pessimists and realists on changing culture, although the 
evidence of the NAO (2017) is mixed as to whether gaming is being ameliorated.  In any 
case, these differing perspectives point to the complexities of understanding the process 
of cultural change in the ambulance service, supporting the findings of others in different 
organisational settings (Sathe 1985; Ogbonna and Harris 2002).   
 
 
   Another important issue concerns the values, attitudes and behaviour of users of the 
service. These seem to have little influence on the organisational culture of ambulance 
services (unlike Ogbonna and Harris’s football fans). This is significant, not least because 
of differences in perception about the appropriateness of emergency calls. The notable 
increase in demand for ambulance and emergency services in general, needs to be 
explored, as this is a major area of friction between ambulance professionals, managers 
and users. The potential political saliency of this issue is revealed through the high profile 
of ambulance services and their perceived failings, and the alleged “misuse” of 999 calls 
across all emergency services. This has significant policy and practice implications.  
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CONCLUSION  
 
 
Organisational culture is a complex and amorphous concept, subject to various local 
contingencies, and is difficult to change. This insight, in itself, is not new as our literature 
survey suggests, but is still relevant in the light of repeated attempts to reform 
organisations through cultural change. The changing role and identity of ambulance 
personnel and the conflict between professional cultures and management objectives are 
significant issues. Indeed, aspects of culture can act to impede government policy. 
Moreover, the interplay between culture and performance measurement have significant 
implications for policy and practice. All these issues make this a fascinating topic for 
further study and research. 
 
 
   While the framework of Ogbonna and Harris (2014) helped to categorise those aspects 
that reinforced cultural perpetuation at Delta and reduced the effectiveness of efforts to 
reform the service, the present study raised additional issues. Their five factors all seem 
to be significant with regard to cultural change and perpetuation in our case. However, 
further factors were identified. These were resource constraints and particularly the role 
of performance measures, which emerged as a key management feature of Delta. Efforts 
to bring about organisational change through training and culture change were countered 
by the continuing emphasis on response times, which perpetuated the existing, dominant 
culture. Attempts to overcome the perverse incentives associated with this have come up 
against the other key elements of historical legacy, subcultural dynamics and employment 
practices. 
 
 
   To conclude, therefore, the role of cultural perpetuation is a key issue within the 
ambulance service and the NHS more generally. Our discussion has centred largely on 
the findings of research into the internal relationships and dynamics within Delta. Further 
research is also needed into the efficacy of recent developments in education at the level 
of Higher Education in furthering professionalization and how that plays off against 
socialisation into 'tribal' sub-cultures. A key question therefore is whether such 
developments have a significant and indeed long-term impact on the culture of the 
service. Likewise inquiry into whether culture(s) in ambulance services could and/or 
should be more receptive to the views of service users would be valuable. The effects of 
the current performance management regime on culture also deserve investigation, 
particularly in a period of austerity. A pertinent issue is whether the dashboard inhibits 
gaming or the persisting emphasis on response times promotes it. 
 
 
   Finally, ambulance services globally are confronted with similar challenges 
surrounding rising activity, an ageing population, societal issues and a drive for 
professionalization of practice and face comparable cultural obstacles in evolving into 
professional healthcare providers (Hou et al. 2013). Findings from this study, therefore, 
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have international implications and further comparative research can investigate these 
issues (Holmes 2010; Middleton 2015; Tanigawa, and Tanaka 2006).   
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